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In a thorough decision reported late July 2026, Deputy Judge Mirilyn Sharp awarded $50,000 plus interest and costs to a woman burned in a laser hair removal procedure.

For reasons unknown, counsel for the defendants, Derma Bar and esthetician Teresa Distasio, was convinced the plaintiff was owed no more than $5,000. The defendants refused an offer to settle for $10,000.

At trial, counsel seemed focused on mitigation. Why didn't the plaintiff seek treatment for the scarring? Why didn't she use make up to cover the scars and hypopigmentation?

I sometimes see people online confidently assert that a pet is considered property, and if it is injured or killed, its owner is entitled only to the cost of replacing it. And yes, that was the case for centuries. But the law does respond to societal changes, eventually, and in Ontario, pet owners are now awarded damages for pain and suffering after the loss of a pet.

Birmingham Business Centre Inc. et al. v. Natalia Cach (2025 CanLII 120697 (ON SCSM)) was an assessment of damages hearing arising from the deaths of two pet rabbits (Leo, a lion-head rabbit, and Ruby, a Himalayan rabbit) and damage to other property. The plaintiffs were Birmingham Business Centre Inc. ("Birmingham"), its sole director Christine Sobolak (who was also the property manager and owner of the rabbits), and others connected to Birmingham. The defendant, Natalia Cach, had been noted in default, having been duly served the previous month. Because she was in default, the plaintiffs were not required to prove liability, only the quantum of their damages.

I've had to sit through motion hearings in which most of the time is spent by the motions judge patiently explaining to a young lawyer how Small Claims Court works.

Professors devote no time to the inferior court. (One of my own intructors called it "kindergarten court.") I get it, but lawyers are going to continue wasting the court's time and their clients' money. 

Balancing free speech with reputation protection

Defamation law walks a fine line between safeguarding individual reputations and preserving the right to free expression. At its core, defamation occurs when a false statement of fact harms a person’s reputation. However, society recognizes that opinions—even critical ones—are essential to public discourse. This tension gave rise to the fair comment defense, which allows defendants to avoid liability if their statements qualify as honest, fair opinions based on disclosed facts.

A pivotal case in Canadian defamation law, Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada et al. v. Dalrymple (1966 CanLII 18), clarified a critical limitation of this defense: malice can destroy it. This article summarizes the case, explains the fair comment defense, and dissects why malicious intent undermines its protections. By understanding Sun Life v. Dalrymple, individuals and businesses alike can better navigate defamation risks while exercising responsible free speech.